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Abstract
Increased uptake of variable renewable generation and further electrification of energy demand necessitate efficient
coordination of flexible demand resources to make most efficient use of power system assets. Flexible electrical loads are
typically small, numerous, heterogeneous and owned by self-interested agents. Considering the multi-temporal nature of
flexibility and the uncertainty involved, scheduling them is a complex task. This paper proposes a forecast-mediated
real-time market-based control approach (F-MBC) for cost minimizing coordination of uninterruptible time-shiftable
(i.e. deferrable) loads. F-MBC is scalable, privacy preserving, and usable by device agents with small computational
power. Moreover, F-MBC is proven to overcome the challenge of mutually conflicting decisions from equivalent devices.
Simulations in a simplified but challenging case study show that F-MBC produces near-optimal behaviour over multiple
time-steps.
Keywords: Market-based Control, Markov Decision Process, Flexibility, Demand Response, Distributed Energy
Resources.
1. Introduction
Power systems have seen an increasing penetration of
distributed energy resources (DERs), such as distributed
generators, flexible demand, and small-scale renewable gen-
eration. This trend has significant impacts on the network,
leading to congestion, reduced network utilization, and
even instability or system inoperability at the distribution
level [1]. Consequently, the transition to future power
systems requires either a great deal of investment in grid
reinforcement, or efficient use of flexibility from DERs
through coordination.
Optimal coordination among DERs is a complex multi-
dimensional problem, especially in settings with small,
numerous, heterogeneous DERs owned by self-interested
agents. The complexity is further amplified by inter-
temporal constraints introduced by shifting energy con-
sumption and uncertainties in DER usage patterns and
renewable-based generation. A suitable coordination ap-
proach for such a setting is required to be simple and usable
by agents with small computational power [2], scalable for
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settings with numerous DERs, and privacy preserving since
the DERs being considered are owned by self-interested
agents.
This problem has been considered in a number of set-
tings, including electric vehicle charging [3], deferrable
loads such as washing machines, dish washers, and ther-
mostatically controlled loads. Most control techniques for
flexible demand are based either on centralized coordina-
tion, top-down control, or price response [4, 5]. Centralized
and top-down approaches (e.g. [6]) are not suitable when
considering privacy, autonomy, and scalability constraints,
whereas completely decentralized approaches relying on
one-way communication (e.g. price response [7, 8]) have un-
certain realized system response. A comprehensive review
of advantages and disadvantages of control approaches can
be found in [9].
1.1. Market-based Control
A natural fit for the problem of coordinating self-interested
DERs is transactive control, which refers to control ap-
proaches which perform coordination and control tasks
by using economic incentive signaling to exchange infor-
mation about generation, consumption, constraints, and
responsiveness of assets over dynamic, real-time forecasting
periods [10]. Market-based control (MBC) describes a class
of transactive control algorithms that take the form of a
mediated market [11]. In an attempt to find a middle way
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between the aforementioned approaches, this paradigm
provides simultaneously a degree of privacy, autonomy,
certainty, and openness compared to the aforementioned
approaches [5, 9]. However, when used for coordination
among numerous DERs, over multiple time-steps and tak-
ing into account uncertainty, MBC approaches rapidly grow
in complexity, limiting their scalability and practical fea-
sibility. For example, multi-settlement markets, such as
in [12, 13] require complex bid formulation algorithms,
which is especially hard for devices with small compu-
tational power [2]. Accounting for uncertainty similarly
increases complexity, as is evident in the hierarchical MBC
approach in [14]. In [15, 16], iterative approaches for co-
ordination were proposed. An iterative approach based
on Mean-field games was proposed in [17]. However, [18]
indicates iterative approaches are not suitable for real-
time operations due to uncertain convergence time and
dependence on initial conditions. The same logic applies
for negotiation approaches such as in [19]. On the other
hand, approaches based on the assumption of cooperative
agents [20, 21, 22] are not suitable for the settings with
self-interested agents.
1.2. Real-time Market-based Control
In this paper, we use the term “Real-time market-based
control (RTMBC)” to describe a simple and scalable form
of MBC. In RTMBC, DERs are represented by autonomous
agents participating in a spot power market. The market
is cleared for the upcoming time-step (i.e. in real time)
by means of a double auction. The use of decentralized
decision making and a centralized one-shot market clearing
simplifies the whole process. Device level constraints and
objectives are taken into account in the process of bid/offer
formulation. An example of such approach can be seen
in [9].
Despite these beneficial properties, in practice RTMBC
often leads to poor performance over multiple time-steps
due to uncertainty, inter-temporal constraints of uninter-
ruptible devices, and mutually-conflicting decisions that
arise from decentralization and the self-interested behaviour
of agents [23, 24, 18]. For example, in [25] the effect of such
behaviour is shown to lead to exhaustion of flexibility in
the system. An approach for coordination among thermo-
statically controlled loads was presented in [26]. This was
further studied in [23] where it was found prone to load
synchronization and power oscillations. Agents submitting
similar bids (i.e. Bulk switching), and clustering at lower
price periods are phenomena that occur when optimal de-
cisions from the agents’ perspective conflict and lead to
sub-optimal outcomes both at the agent level and system
level. This is most apparent in case of identical devices
given the same information. Therefore, identical devices
pose a challenge to many coordination approaches.
1.3. Summary of contributions
In this paper, we aim at solving the problem of schedul-
ing a set of uninterruptible deferrable loads over multiple
time-steps to minimize generation cost taking into account
uncertainty. We will refer to this as the “optimal coordi-
nation problem”. To achieve this, we propose the forecast-
mediated market-based control approach (F-MBC). F-MBC
relies on decentralized bid formulation and centralized one-
shot market clearing to coordinate among these devices.
The proposed approach is scalable and preserves end-user
privacy and autonomy. It relies on probabilistic price fore-
casts obtained by a facilitator that accounts for uncertainty
in renewable-based generation and DER usage patterns.
Moreover, we design a low-complexity Markov decision pro-
cess(MDP) based optimal bidding algorithm for deferrable
loads, which is usable by a device with limited computa-
tional power (e.g. embedded systems) to formulate a bid
that minimizes its own expected cost given probabilistic
price forecasts. We show that the combination of prob-
abilistic reference prices, optimal bidding, and real-time
market clearing solves the problem of mutually-conflicting
decisions among identical devices; that is, two identical
device agents with different deadlines will never have the
same bid. This is shown mathematically in Section 2. Ad-
ditionally, we design a tie-breaking mechanism to assist in
market clearing when several agents are indifferent between
different actions at the market-clearing price. Moreover, we
prove approximate consistency of the approach by bound-
ing the deviation from the optimal solution that occurs
if the forecast correctly identifies an optimal feasible solu-
tion. We show by simulation that the proposed F-MBC
approach achieves near-optimal system level performance
over multiple time-steps (i.e. minimizes overall generation
cost) in Section 3.
2. Methodology
Consider a setting of uninterruptible deferrable loads,
with deadlines set by their respective owners. This re-
sembles a collection of devices such as irrigation pumps,
greenhouse lighting, or home appliances such as washing
machines, dryers, etc. [27, 28]. We assume that each of the
deferrable loads acts in its economic best interest, minimiz-
ing its consumption cost subject to device level constraints
(e.g. deadline, uninterruptibility).
The challenge is to design a scheme that fully or approxi-
mately solves the optimal coordination problem, scheduling
the flexible demand over multiple discrete time-steps with
the objective of minimizing the overall generation cost. It
is important to note that the global cost minimization is
equivalent to social welfare maximization since the total
energy demand (and, therefore, the utility) is fixed. There-
fore, for the remainder of the paper we will just use the
term “optimal coordination”.
To achieve this, we rely on the idea of “self-fulfilling
forecasts”. As illustrated in Figure 1, F-MBC comprises
three types of autonomous agents; A facilitator, an auction-
eer, and a device agent per flexible device. The facilitator
is a central entity which, in general, does not have ac-
cess to private information (e.g. deadlines, cycle durations)
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and cannot directly control the devices. This is a sensible
assumption in settings where DERs are small, numerous
and owned by self-interested agents. Such an approach
is similar to the vision of layered decentralized optimiza-
tion architecture in [29]. The facilitator utilizes aggregate
historical information, forecasts, behaviour patterns, and
system models to estimate an “offline optimal” solution to
the optimal coordination problem. Some examples of tech-
niques to solve such a problem can be found in [30, 31, 32].
The resulting estimated schedule is probabilistic and results
in a probabilistic reference price for each time-step (in the
form of a probability distribution), thus taking into account
uncertainty. Throughout, we assume that the price of en-
ergy paid by devices equals the marginal cost of generation
at the relevant time step. The probabilistic reference prices
are then communicated to the flexible demand agents which
use this information for bid formulation. Device agents
formulate their respective bids in a self-interested manner
(i.e. minimizing the expected cost incurred by the agent).
A device agent takes into account local deadline and un-
interruptibility constraints in addition to the probabilistic
reference prices provided by the facilitator. Bids are then
submitted to a central auctioneer in the form of a demand
function. Finally, an allocation is made through a one-shot
double auction and an additional tie breaking mechanism.
The facilitator updates the “estimate” for the future tak-
ing into account the market outcome which results in an
updated probabilistic reference price signal. The whole
process is repeated for every time-step.
It is noteworthy here that aggregation of bids can be
done centrally or through hierarchical aggregation of bid
functions. This means that the complexity of aggregating
bids is linear, at worst, or logarithmic, at best, when the
system is organized as a binary tree. This, combined with
decentralized bid optimization, one-shot market clearing
and the non-iterative nature of the approach makes it scal-
able and simple to implement even in scenarios where agents
have small computational power. Moreover, the outcome
of this process is a near-optimal system-level behaviour
over multiple time-steps. The resulting coordination ap-
proximates the “offline optimal coordination” estimated a
priori, so the probabilistic reference prices can be consid-
ered “self-fulfilling”.
2.1. Mathematical Framework
Consider a scheduling horizon consisting of the set of
discrete time steps T = {1, . . . ,T} with fixed intervals
∆t. The subscript t will be used to refer both to the in-
stant t as well as the interval that immediately follows,
depending on the context. The system comprises a set A of
uninterruptible deferrable devices owned by self-interested
consumers. Each device is represented by an agent a de-
fined by a deadline, duration and a power consumption
pattern da, Da, {P a0 , . . . , P aDa−1} respectively. The system
also has inflexible demand, and flexible generation with a
non-decreasing marginal cost mt(P ) (which may include
zero-cost renewable generation). An optimal coordination
· · ·
Probabilistic
reference prices
Device agent
bids
1
2
Market
outcome3
Local control
actions4
Aggregate historical data
Weather forecast
Load forecast
Aggregate behaviour patterns
System models Updated
historical data5
Figure 1: Schematic overview of the proposed F-MBC approach
denotes the allocation of flexible devices over the scheduling
horizon, such that the overall cost of generation to meet
the aggregate demand P1:T is minimized:
P ∗1:T = arg min
P1:T
T∑
i=1
∆t
∫ Pt
0
mt(P
′)dP ′. (1)
This is subject to system-level constraints (i.e. supply/demand
matching, flexible generation limits), and agent-level con-
straints (i.e. deadlines, uninterruptibility).
2.2. MDP-based Optimal Bidding
At this point, we describe how an agent may compute
and optimize its bid given the probabilistic reference prices
supplied by the facilitator. We represent these prices, hav-
ing the form of time-dependent probability distributions,
by independent random variables Xt with bounded ex-
pectation E(Xt) = x¯t < ∞. Each device agent aims at
minimizing its expected cost out of self-interest. For that,
we develop a MDP model for optimal bidding which consists
of a state space, action space and a set of rewards/costs.
We show that the MDP-based bidding algorithm minimizes
the expected cost for the device (i.e. optimal in expec-
tation) given the available information (i.e. probabilistic
price reference) and the assumption that a single device
is a price taker. For an uninterruptible deferrable device,
the action space only consists of two actions on, off. The
state consists of a possible realization of the price, and the
status (sat ) of the device, where s
a
t = 0 for a device that
has not started yet (i.e. waiting), sat = {1, . . . , Da−1} for
a device that has started (i.e. running), and sat = D for a
device that has run for D time-steps (i.e. finished).
If the uninterruptible device a switches from the waiting
to the running state at time t with a market clearing price
xt, its expected total running cost is a combination of the
cost of starting at t with a price of xt, and the sum of the
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expected costs for the remainder of the device’s cycle,
Cs,at (xt) = xt · P a0 ·∆t+
Da−1∑
i=1
x¯t+i · P ai ·∆t (2)
The agent aims to minimize its running cost. It does so by,
at each time step, submitting a bid function bat (x), defined
by a threshold price xˆat . The definition of an optimal bid
function is given below.
Theorem 1. For a sequence of independent reference
prices Xt with bounded expectation, agent a minimizes
its expected running cost by submitting the threshold-based
bid function bat (x), where
bat (x) =
{
P a x ≤ xˆat
0 x > xˆat
, (3)
P a =
{
P asat ifs
a
t < D
a
0 otherwise
(4)
xˆat =

−∞ if sat = Da
∞ if sat = 1, . . . , Da − 1
zat if s
a
t = 0
, (5)
zat =
∞ t ≥ d
a −Da
C∗at+1−
∑Da−1
i=1 x¯t+i·Pai ·∆t
Pa0 ·∆t t < d
a −Da , (6)
and C∗at is the optimal expected cost at t, which is recur-
sively defined in reverse order for t ≤ da −Da by
C∗ada−Da =
Da−1∑
i=0
x¯da−Da+i · P ai ·∆t, (7)
C∗at =Pr(Xt > xˆ
a
t ) · C∗at+1
+ Pr(Xt ≤ xˆat ) · E [Cs,at (Xt)|Xt ≤ xˆat ] . (8)
Proof. In order for bat (x) to be optimal, the optimal action
for an agent must be on if the clearing price xt is smaller
than or equal to the threshold bid xˆat , and off if it is larger
than the threshold bid. First, if sat = D (i.e. finished),
the only feasible, thus optimal, action is off regardless
of the price (bat (x) = 0, i.e. xˆ
a
t = −∞). Similarly, if
sat = 1, . . . D
a − 1 (i.e. running), and has not completed its
task, the only feasible, thus optimal, action is on regardless
of the price (bat (x) = P
a
i , i.e. xˆ
a
t = ∞), where i is the
relevant time period in the devices program. Finally, a
waiting device has different optimal actions based on the
following logic.
• At time-step t = da −Da, a waiting device a must
switch to the running state to meet the deadline, so
the optimal action is on irrespective of the clearing
price (i.e. xˆat = ∞). The expected cost associated
with starting immediately is therefore also optimal:
C∗ada−Da = E
[
Cs,ada−Da(Xda−Da)
]
, resulting in (7).
• At time-steps t < da − Da, if a has not started
yet, the action on is optimal when the expected cost
for switching on is less than the expected cost for
waiting and acting optimally at t + 1, that is, if
Cs,at (Xt) < C
∗a
t+1. Conversely, if C
s,a
t (Xt) > C
∗a
t+1,
only off is optimal. Therefore, the threshold zat for
t < da −Da in (6) is derived from the equality
Cs,at (xˆ
a
t ) = C
∗a
t+1. (9)
When the equality holds, agent a is indifferent be-
tween starting and waiting.
Given the existence of optimal threshold bids xˆat and (7),
the optimal expected cost (8) for t < da −Da follows by
backwards induction.
In the following, we consider how different deadlines
impact the bids of otherwise identical agents. Identical
devices pose a challenge due to the increased possibility for
synchronised and conflicting decisions [23, 24, 18, 25, 26].
We argue that F-MBC provides a natural way to resolve
such conflicts.
In the proofs, we shall assume that at any time, the
forecast price has a non-zero probability to exceed the
largest finite threshold price: Pr(Xt > xˆ
a
t ) > 0, ∀a,∀t : t <
da −Da. Practically, this means remaining in a waiting
state is always an option, unless an agent is forced to start
by an upcoming deadline.1
Definition 1. Agents {1, . . . , n} are rapid-starting, identi-
cal and deadline-ordered if their power requirement and ser-
vice duration are identical and they start consuming immedi-
ately (∀a, i : Da ≡ D,P ai ≡ Pi, P a0 6= 0), but their deadlines
satisfy d1 < d2 < . . . < dn. They are weakly deadline-
ordered if their deadlines satisfy d1 ≤ d2 ≤ . . . ≤ dn.
Lemma 2. A collection of n rapid-starting, identical,
deadline-ordered devices that is in the waiting state at
time t, operating under the optimal MDP policy, will bid
with a strictly decreasing sequence of threshold prices: xˆ1t >
xˆ2t > . . . > xˆ
n
t . A weakly deadline-ordered collection will
bid with a non-increasing sequence of threshold prices:
xˆ1t ≥ xˆ2t ≥ . . . ≥ xˆnt .
Proof. Contained in Appendix A.
Theorem 3. A collection of n rapid-starting, identical,
deadline-ordered devices, operating under the optimal MDP
policy, will start (and complete) in order of their deadlines.
1If this condition does not hold for a given pair {a, t}, agent a
concludes that it is always optimal to start at time t (or at an earlier
time), i.e. for all possible realisations of the random clearing price
Xt. This effectively adjusts the deadline da → d˜a = t + Da, thus
removing the differentiation in threshold bids among affected devices.
We note that this is desirable behaviour if the forecaster correctly
identified the range of Xt, but may cause problems if this range was
underestimated, hence including a non-vanishing tail probability in
the forecast is recommended.
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Proof. Prior to the first auction, all agents are in the
waiting state. In the auction, agents with a threshold
bid exceeding (and sometimes including) the clearing price
transition to the running state. Lemma 2 guarantees that
these are agents with the earliest deadlines. This process
is repeated for subsequent auctions with devices that have
not started yet.
2.3. Market Clearing and Tie Breaking
The market is cleared via a one-shot double auction
for each time-step. We assume that generation truthfully
reveals its marginal cost function. The aggregate offer
function accounts for flexible generation and inflexible gen-
eration in the upcoming time-step in the form of a marginal
cost function. Device agents submit their bids only for the
upcoming time-step. The aggregate bid function includes
inflexible demand and the bids submitted by flexible de-
mand. The market is cleared at time-step t at the price xt
at which supply meets demand. Then, the market-clearing
price is communicated to device agents which determine
their local control actions based on their earlier submitted
bids.
Although Lemma 2 ensures differentiation of bids among
devices with different deadlines, equal bids may be submit-
ted, for example if identical devices have identical deadlines.
A tie situation occurs when the market clears at the price
bid by multiple agents, xt = xˆ
a
t = xˆ
b
t = . . .. The aggregate
bid/offer functions for such a case are shown in Figure 2.
A large step in the aggregate bid can cause difficulties in
market clearing (i.e. bulk switching). To address this issue,
we introduce a tie breaking mechanism among such agents.
The tie breaking mechanism determines which of the
tied agents can start at the current time-step and which
will wait for a later time-step. Each agent submits a ran-
dom number ρa along with its bid. When the auctioneer
detects a tie situation, it determines a value ρ∗ so that
only bids with ρa ≤ ρ∗ will be accepted. ρ∗ is chosen such
that demand most closely approximates the supply at the
clearing price xt.
Due to the discrete nature of the loads, an exact match
may not be found. In such a case, the bid of the marginal
device a is accepted with probability γPa , where γ is the
difference between the supply at xt and the demand without
the marginal device. Agents will be charged the market
clearing price xt while generation should supply at a slightly
higher (lower) set-point, and is paid accordingly. This
results in a budget imbalance that vanishes in expectation
(i.e. averages to zero in the long term). This is illustrated
in Figure 2.
We note that the random tie breaking mechanism does
not affect optimality or fairness as it is only used to break
ties among agents with bids that are equal to the market
clearing price. Agents are indifferent between starting and
waiting at their bid price, so those who are not allocated
will wait for a later time-step and eventually incur the same
expected cost as those which were allocated. Therefore,
they have no incentive to game the tie-breaking mechanism.
Supply
xt
Allocated
demand
Non-allocated
demand
xt
cut-offγ
Allocated
Non-allocated
Allocated with probability γ
Price x
P
ow
er
(k
W
)
Higher
set-point
Lower
set-point
Price x
Figure 2: A tie situation; devices that are indifferent between starting
or waiting at xt are allocated randomly.
Also, because ρa is generated locally, tie breaking can be
implemented using a broadcast of ρ∗. The alternative,
where ρa is determined by the auctioneer, would require a
targeted message to each device.
2.4. Alignment of Optimal Coordination and Self Interest
According to the previously stated definition of the
optimal coordination problem, our objective is to steer
the cluster of flexible devices towards an optimal system-
level behaviour (i.e. total generation cost minimization).
To guarantee a stable optimum, it is necessary that the
optimal coordination corresponds to a Nash equilibrium.
This guarantees that it is in the best interest of the device
agents not to deviate from such behaviour. Therefore, we
show that the global cost minimizing solution indeed cor-
responds to a Nash equilibrium. To analyse the potential
for F-MBC to achieve optimal system-level behaviour, we
first consider the schedule achieved by a clairvoyant opti-
mizer with complete information. We give conditions under
which this schedule corresponds to the outcome of a Nash
equilibrium, i.e. agents cannot benefit by deviating from
the starting time-step allocated by the central optimizer.
These results indicate that the central F-MBC facilitator
should aim to estimate the prices that correspond to such a
system optimal allocation, so that devices are incentivised
to realise the reference prices.
We consider a cost-optimal allocation of flexible devices,
characterized by an aggregate load profile P ∗t and a starting
time ta for each flexible device a, summarized as S =
({P ∗t }t=1:T, {ta}a=1:A). Without loss of generality, in the
following we take the perspective of an arbitrary deferrable
device agent a that has a duration D and uninterruptible
consumption pattern {P a0 , . . . , P aD−1}, which is scheduled
to start at t = ta under the cost-optimal allocation. No
assumptions are made about the properties of other flexible
loads. Let P¬at be the cost-optimal load pattern P
∗
t minus
the consumption of device a starting at ta, and mt(P ) be
the monotone increasing function in P which represents
the marginal cost of a unit of generation at generation level
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P and time t. The cost to the system of running device a
at time t is
Kat = ∆t
D−1∑
i=0
∫ P¬at+i+Pai
P¬at+i
mt+i(P )dP. (10)
The fact that the starting time ta is optimal with respect
to overall system cost, implies that
Kata ≤ Kat , ∀t ∈ T . (11)
Switching from the system perspective to that of an in-
dividual, we assume that the a pays a price equal to the
marginal cost of energy. The total price paid by agent a
starting at t is
Πat = ∆t
D−1∑
i=0
mt+i(P
¬a
t+i + P
a
i )P
a
i . (12)
The allocation S is a Nash equilibrium if for each agent a,
Πata ≤ Πat , ∀t ∈ T . (13)
In the following, we identify conditions where global cost-
optimality (11) implies the Nash equilibrium condition (13).
We first consider a (restrictive) special case in which the
implication holds exactly; we then consider a weaker set of
conditions that results in Theorem 5 and Corollary 6 with
much broader applicability.
Theorem 4. If mt(P ) is an affine function with constant
slope dmt(P )/dP = c,∀t, then S is a Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Evaluating the integral in (10) using the affine struc-
ture of mt(P ) yields
Kat = Π
a
t −
c∆t
2
D−1∑
i=0
(P ai )
2. (14)
Because the last term does not depend on t or P ∗, (11)
implies (13) and S is a NE.
Note that mt(P ) does not need to be strictly affine with
slope c for all P , but only for those marginal power levels
that are accessible by flexible devices. This is the case in
the example in Section 3.
Definition 2. The allocation S is a δ-relaxed Nash equi-
librium if the condition (13) is replaced by the weaker con-
dition
Πata ≤ (1 + δ)Πat , ∀t ∈ T . (15)
The δ-relaxed Nash equilibrium is effectively a Nash
equilibrium for devices that are insensitive to relative price
differentials of size δ. Clearly, it converges to a regular
Nash equilibrium in the limit δ ↓ 0. We note that this is
closely related to the concept of an ε-equilibrium [33].
Theorem 5. If there exists an ε < 1 so that,
mt(P
¬a
t + P
a
i )−mt(P¬at ) ≤ εmt(P¬at + P ai ),
∀t ∈ T ,∀i ∈ {0, . . . , D − 1}, (16)
then S is a δ-relaxed Nash equilibrium with δ = ε/(1− ε)
Proof. From definitions (10), (12), (16) and the fact that
mt(P ) is non-decreasing, it follows that
(1− ε)Πat ≤ Kat ≤ Πat , ∀t ∈ T . (17)
By chaining the first inequality (for t = ta) with (11) and
the second inequality, we obtain
(1− ε)Πata ≤ Πat , ∀t ∈ T . (18)
Substitution of δ = ε/(1 − ε) and comparison with (15)
completes the proof.
Corollary 6. In the limit where agents are price takers
(individually), S is a Nash equilibrium.
Proof. When agents are price takers their influence on mt
is negligibly small; this implies that Theorem 5 applies with
the limit ε ↓ 0. Therefore, δ ↓ 0 in (15) and the stronger
condition (13) holds.
This result effectively extends the Nash equilibrium to
to all sufficiently large systems with continuous marginal
cost functions. Note that the notion of individual device
agents being price takers does not preclude devices from
collectively influencing prices significantly.
2.5. Approximate consistency of solutions
In this section we quantify the consistency of the pro-
posed F-MBC approach. Ideally, if the facilitator is able to
supply the agents with reference prices that are realisable
and near-optimal, the agents should respond with bids that
result in start times consistent with that profile. If this is
the case, the (near-)Nash Equilibrium that is encoded in
the reference prices would become self-fulfilling. In order
to quantify this property, we investigate deviations from
the optimal coordination solution in the limit where the
reference prices correspond to such a solution. We do so for
the special case of a collection of rapid-starting, identical
devices, and a single time step t. In the following, super-
scripts a are dropped for identical quantities (e.g. durations
D). Near-optimality of price forecasts is represented by
price forecasts Xt′ = mt′(P
∗
t′) + ∆t′ for t
′ > t, where P ∗t:T
represents a feasible cost-optimal consumption schedule
and the magnitude of ∆t:T is strictly bounded from below.
Lemma 7. Consider a collection of rapid starting devices
operating under the F-MBC framework, and a cost-optimal
allocation S, characterised by a starting time ta ≥ t for each
device a, and an aggregate load P ∗t:T (including inflexible
load).
6
If devices receive near-optimal reference prices Xt′ =
mt′(P
∗
t′) + ∆t′ , where E[∆t′ ] = 0 and Pr(∆t′ > −η) = 1
for η > 0 for all t′ ∈ {t, . . . , T}, then the difference between
the clearing price xt and the reference price x
∗
t = mt(P
∗
t )
is bounded by
−
∑D−1
i=0 Pi [∆mt,i + η]
P0
≤ xt − x∗t ≤
max
t′∈{t+1,...,T}
∑D−1
i=0 Pi∆mt′,i
P0
(19)
with
∆mt,i = mt(P
∗
t )−mt(P ∗t − Pi) (20)
Proof. Contained in Appendix B.
Let n∗t be the number of devices starting at t under
the optimal allocation S, and nt the number of devices
starting using the F-MBC dispatch method. Under the
additional assumption of smoothness of the marginal cost of
generation, it is possible to derive bounds for the difference
nt − n∗t , as follows.
Theorem 8. Assume that Lemma 7 holds, and that mt(P )
can be approximated around P ∗t by
mt(P ) = mt(P
∗
t ) + ct [P − P ∗t ] . (21)
Then
−
⌈∑D−1
i=0
[
ct+iP
2
i + ηPi
]
ctP 20
⌉
≤ nt − n∗t ≤
max
t′∈{t+1,...,T}
⌈∑D−1
i=0 ct′+iP
2
i
ctP 20
⌉
. (22)
Proof. The optimal clearing price x∗t is associated with
the desired number of starting devices n∗t . Linearity of
the marginal cost function and rounding up/down to the
nearest integer results in⌊
xt − x∗t
ctP0
⌋
≤ nt − n∗t ≤
⌈
xt − x∗t
ctP0
⌉
(23)
Combining with (19) and making use of
∆mt,i = ctPi (24)
results in (22).
Corollary 9. In the special case where mt(P ) is an affine
function with constant slope ct = c, devices consume a
constant amount of power (Pi = P ) and in the limit of
vanishing uncertainty (η ↓ 0), we have
−D − 1 ≤ nt − n∗t ≤ D. (25)
These results show that the F-MBC dispatch converges
to the optimal dispatch within hard limits. These limits do
not depend on the total number of devices, so the relative
performance increases with the number of devices.
Moreover, the analysis above considers only a single
time step t. If the number of devices nt starting at t exceeds
n∗t , this results in higher prices for subsequent time steps,
thus reducing the number of devices that start at t+1 until
t + D − 1. Conversely, if the number of device starts is
lower than scheduled, this will incentivise additional starts
in subsequent time steps. Although not quantified here,
this self-regulating effect further reinforces the convergence
to the reference solution.
3. Experimental analysis
Using simulations, we illustrate two features of the
proposed F-MBC approach. First, we show that F-MBC
performance is near-optimal over multiple time-steps when
price uncertainty is negligible (consistency). Second, we
analyze the robustness of the solution to varying amounts
of uncertainty in price forecasts in order to qualify the need
for accurate estimation of reference prices.
3.1. Case Study Description
For this case study, we consider a system with identical
deferrable loads. This represents a particularly challenging
scenario, due to a high probability of ties occurring and a
lumpiness of loads that does not permit full ‘valley filling’
of the solution. A full day (24 hours, starting at 21:00)
was simulated with market clearing at 5 min time steps. A
fixed horizon at 20:55 the next day was used for forecasting
and bid formation. The system included 1200 deferrable
loads, with a duration of 1 h and fixed consumption of
2 kW each. Deadlines were distributed in two clusters of
600 devices, normally distributed with a standard deviation
of 1 hour around 7:00 in the early morning and 17:00 in the
early evening, and rounded to the nearest 5 min time-step.
Inflexible demand was modelled using load data from [34]
aggregated and scaled to a peak of 350 kW. Wind genera-
tion with a peak of 500 kW was generated using [35] and
a simple wind turbine model that approximates the per-
formance of a 100 kW wind turbine [36], scaled to 500 kW.
We assume that wind power generation is free and curtail-
able. The simulation input data can be seen in Figure 3.
Simulations were performed in Matlab.
Flexible generation was represented by a time-independent,
linearly increasing marginal cost function
m(P g) =
P g
k
, P g ≥ 0, (26)
where P g is the power generated by the flexible generator
fleet and k = 500 kW2min, with arbitrary units for cur-
rency. With this choice, the total cost of generation (wind
and flexible generation), has an affine marginal cost, pro-
vided that P g > 0. Therefore, it follows from Theorem 4
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Figure 3: Simulation input data. Top: Wind power generation and
inflexible load profile. Bottom: Distribution of device deadlines across
the 5 minute time intervals.
that the device schedule from a clairvoyant optimizer with
complete information corresponds to the outcome of a Nash
equilibrium.
3.2. Simulating the Facilitator: Clairvoyance and complete
control
To establish the potential of F-MBC as a coordination
mechanism via simulations, we first identify the theoreti-
cal optimal coordination that can be obtained only by a
clairvoyant optimizer with complete control. Accordingly,
we obtain optimal reference prices that reflect an optimal
allocation of demand using perfect foresight. Due to our
selection of identical, fixed consumption devices, this can
be done by solving the mixed-integer quadratic program
(MIQP) that finds the optimal number of devices to start
at each time-step σt, and optimal flexible power generation
for each time-step P gt such that the total generation cost
over multiple time-steps is minimized:
minimize
P gt ,σt,ot
∑
t∈T
1
2
· (P
g
t )
2
k
·∆t, (27)
subject to, ∀t ∈ T ,
P gt ≥ 0, (28)
P gt + P
r
t ≥ ot · P a + P lt , (29)
t∑
i=1
σi ≥ φd(t+D), t ≤ T−D, (30)
t∑
i=1
σi = φd(T), T−D + 1 ≤ t ≤ T (31)
σt ≥ 0, (32)
ot =
{∑t
j=1 σj t ≤ D
σt + (ot−1 − σt−D) t > D
(33)
where at time-step t, φd(t) is the number of devices with
deadlines before or at t, P lt is power consumption by inflex-
ible load, P rt is the power from renewable sources, ot is the
number of devices running at t. The objective function in
(27) is the integral of the marginal cost (26). Generator
limits and supply/demand matching constraints are repre-
sented by (28) and (29), respectively. It is assumed that
renewable generation is curtailed when a generation surplus
occurs. The number of device start-ups to any time-step
t must be at least equal to the number of devices which
have a deadline before or at t+D, and for the last time
periods it should be exactly the total number of devices
with a deadline before T . This is represented by (30)-(31).
Device uninterruptibility is ensured by (32)-(33). Com-
bined, (30)-(33) guarantee that devices will not miss their
respective deadlines. By solving the MIQP, a cost-optimal
system load profile is obtained, which corresponds to a set
of reference prices x∗t ∀t ∈ T . While the reference solution
here does not account for specific allocation for each agent,
one realization of the reference schedule can be achieved by
giving priority to devices according to their proximity to
their respective deadlines, with ties being broken randomly,
and assuming that devices do not switch off until their cy-
cle (duration) is complete. The optimization was repeated
after each market clearing to account for deviations from
the previous reference solution, to effectively generate an
“up-to-date” forecast at each time step.
3.3. Simulating the Facilitator: bounded information and
Uncertainty
As previously established, probabilistic reference prices
are required. In reality, the facilitator would provide prob-
abilistic reference prices that depend on actual forecasts
and information used in generating the reference. Instead,
for simulation purposes, probabilistic price forecasts were
generated by adding noise to the deterministic reference
prices x∗t as follows. It was assumed that uncertainties are
exogenous and independent for each time-step, and fore-
cast prices at each time-step are log-normally distributed,
with a standard deviation that increases with time. The
standard deviation of the price Xt as forecast at t
′ ≤ t is
parametrised by the day-ahead uncertainty ν24h as
SDt = x
∗
t · ν24h ·
(t− t′)
24h
. (34)
Moreover, forecasting errors were simulated by adjust-
ing the mean of the log-normal forecasts: the expected
prices x¯t were sampled from the log-normal distribution
with mean x∗t and standard deviation SDt. The values
x¯t, SDt ∀t ∈ T were communicated to agents to be used
for bid formulation.
3.4. Results
Figure 4 shows simulation results obtained with negligi-
ble uncertainty (ν24h = 10−5), demonstrating that F-MBC
achieves near-optimal performance over multiple time-steps.
8
It can be seen from top panel that the device schedule ob-
tained by F-MBC closely resembles the schedule obtained
from the MIQP reference solution. The difference in to-
tal generation cost in this case is 0.08 % compared to the
reference solution.
Moreover, the centre panel shows the approximate ‘val-
ley filling’ behaviour of the solution, especially compared
to the system without flexible demand (dotted line). We
note that perfect flattening of flexible power generation is
not feasible due to the extended run time (1 hour, i.e. 12
time steps) of loads. In the bottom panel, costs incurred
by devices are plotted against their starting times. The
actual costs obtained using F-MBC are very close to the
nearly identical costs obtained using MIQP.
We compare the performance of F-MBC to three al-
ternative coordination techniques in Figure 5, depicting
the same information as the lower two panels of Figure 4.
Lack of coordination is represented by the “latest start” ap-
proach where devices start at the latest time-step possible
without missing their respective deadlines. The “Naive
MBC” approach implements naive agents that submit
a bid between the minimum expected price xat,min and
maximum expected price xat,max that occur before their
latest start time da − D − 1. The bid placed is xˆat =
xat,min + t(x
a
t,max − xat,min)/(da − Da − 1), and generally
increases as devices approach their deadlines. Moreover, we
demonstrate the importance of utilizing probabilistic fore-
casts by implementing a “point forecast MBC” approach,
where each agent only receives a time-series of expected
prices and places an optimal bid using backward induction.
This approach performs sub-optimally and yields a total
cost error of 9.6 %.
To evaluate the effect of forecast uncertainty on the
performance of the F-MBC approach, we vary ν24h from
10−5 to 1 (i.e. 100%). Figure 6 shows the results of
20 independent simulation runs for each value of ν24h. The
top panel shows the distribution of realised cost of flexi-
ble generation, compared with the reference solution. It
demonstrates near-optimal performance even for significant
uncertainties in forecast prices.
The middle panel compares the individual payments
made by device agents (1200× 20 for each value of ν24h)
against the payments under the reference schedule. For
forecast uncertainties up to 10%, these are approximately
zero-mean, so that devices are on average as well off us-
ing the F-MBC coordination scheme as under the Nash
equilibrium.
Finally, the bottom panel depicts the distribution of
regret that device agents have as a result of F-MBC (i.e.
the difference between the actual price paid and the lowest
possible price in retrospect). The positive values indicate
small deviations from a Nash equilibrium. However, the
computed regret can only be used to generate cost savings
individually: collectively, devices would quickly equalise
price savings, as is evidenced by the small system cost
deviations in the top panel.
Collectively, these results demonstrate that when sup-
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Figure 4: Simulation output. Top: Cumulative device starts obtained
by F-MBC compared to the MIQP reference solution. Middle: Load
minus inflexible generation (i.e. power supplied by flexible generation)
for three scenarios: without flexible loads, MIQP reference solution
and F-MBC solution. Bottom: The realized total cost paid by devices
plotted as a function of their starting times.
plied with nearly optimal reference prices, F-MBC is able
to approximate the optimal schedule, but small differences
remain due to the ‘lumpiness’ of load, in line with the
approximate consistency results in Subsection 2.5. How-
ever, these differences are small when averaged over many
runs, and are expected to reduce further as the system size
increases.
4. Discussion & Conclusion
In this paper we considered a setting of uninterruptible
deferrable devices with deadlines set by their respective
owners. By relying on decentralized decision making and
centralized forecasting and market clearing, the F-MBC
approach provides a simple and scalable means of DER
coordination. In terms of communication infrastructure,
the proposed mechanism can be implemented using only
gathering of bids and broadcasts of prices and tie-breaking
cut-off values from the auctioneer to all devices, signif-
icantly reducing implementation complexity. Moreover,
since the information in these broadcasts only concerns
public information, F-MBC preserves end user privacy and
autonomy. The bidding algorithm was shown to automati-
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cally resolve mutually-conflicting decisions between devices
with different deadlines and a tie breaking procedure was
proposed to resolve conflicts between indifferent devices. It
was shown by simulation that near-optimal performance
can be attained by a clairvoyant facilitator, establishing
the consistency of the approach. Moreover, an analysis of
the sensitivity to price forecast uncertainty demonstrates
the robustness of the approach. It was able to achieve
good system-level and device-level performance across an
extended horizon, making use of simple agent logic and
single-period market clearing.
Prices obtained using F-MBC are determined in real-
time, thus exposing users to price uncertainty. The results
suggest that the resulting cost fluctuations even out in the
long run, so that users are not worse off - especially in
comparison with less-optimal schemes. If such exposure is
nevertheless undesirable, an alternative is to use F-MBC
with a virtual currency, only for coordination and control.
A different payment scheme (e.g. fixed subscription, average
price, etc. ) can be operated in parallel.
This paper has introduced the F-MBC concept and
established its desirable properties in a limited set of ap-
plications, thus laying the groundwork for various gener-
alizations. As a proof of concept, we use uninterruptible
deferrable loads. However, relevant extensions for future
work are the inclusion of heterogeneous sets of deferrable
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Figure 6: Sensitivity to uncertainty. Top: Increase in system cost with
respect to the optimal solution. Middle: Distribution of change in
agent payments compared to optimal solution. Bottom: Distribution
of regret of device agents.
loads, interruptible loads and continuously controllable
loads. For example, the charging of electric vehicles can
be approximated as one of uninterruptible deferrable loads,
so that the results derived in this paper directly apply.
However, more elaborate charging models will require ex-
tensions to the bidding and clearing algorithms, and are
the subject of future work.
In addition, machine learning approaches could be used
to generate the forecasts, instead of the stylized approach
used here, and performance under the influence of external
noise (e.g. uncertain wind power output) would be relevant
to investigate to better understand the behaviour of F-MBC
in practice.
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Appendix A. Proof of Lemma 2
Lemma 10. For two rapid-starting, deadline-ordered agents
in the waiting state, at time-step t = d1 − D, C∗1d1−D >
C∗2d1−D.
Proof. Agent 1 must run at t = d1 −D, so restating (7):
C∗1d1−D =E[Xd1−D] · P 10 ·∆t+ D1−1∑
i=1
x¯d1−D+i · P 1i ·∆t
 . (A.1)
Using the definition p = Pr(Xt > xˆ
2
t ), the optimal expected
cost (8) for agent 2 is rewritten as
C∗2d1−D =p
[
C∗2d1−D+1 − Cs,2d1−D(xˆ2d1−D)
]
+ pxˆ2d1−D · P 10 ·∆t
+ (1− p)E[Xd1−D|Xd1−D ≤ xˆ2d1−D] · P 10 ·∆t
+
D1−1∑
i=1
x¯d1−D+i · P 1i ·∆t. (A.2)
The first term vanishes as a result of the threshold price
definition, so the inequality C∗1d1−D > C
∗2
d1−D to be proven
can be simplified to
E[Xd1−D] >
pxˆ2d1−D + (1− p)E[Xd1−D|Xd1−D ≤ xˆ2d1−D]. (A.3)
Considering E[Xd1−D] as the weighted sum of two con-
ditional expectations (above and below xˆ2d1−D), this can
simplified to
p
(
E[Xd1−D|Xd1−D > xˆ2d1−D]− xˆ2d1−D
)
> 0. (A.4)
This is positive under the assumption that p > 0 (prices can
exceed xˆ2t ). Therefore (A.3) holds and C
∗1
d1−D > C
∗2
d1−D.
Lemma 11. For any two rapid-starting, deadline-ordered
agents in the waiting state, and t < d1 − D, if C∗1t+1 >
C∗2t+1, then C
∗1
t > C
∗2
t .
Proof. Analogous to (8), we define Cb,at (xˆ) the expected
cost incurred by agent a at time t, when it submits a first
bid xˆ and subsequent optimal bids:
Cb,at (xˆ) = Pr(Xt > xˆ) · C∗at+1
+ Pr(Xt ≤ xˆ) · E [Cs,at (Xt)|Xt ≤ xˆ] (A.5)
At any time-step t, the expected cost incurred by agent
2 for bidding with a price xˆ1t is by definition greater than
or equal its optimal expected cost,
Cb,2t (xˆ
1
t ) ≥ Cb,2t (xˆ2t ) = C∗2t . (A.6)
The condition C∗1t+1 > C
∗2
t+1, combined with (A.6), and the
assumption Pr(Xt > xˆ
2
t ) > 0, implies
C∗1t = C
b,1
t (xˆ
1
t ) > C
b,2
t (xˆ
1
t ). (A.7)
Combining (A.6), (A.7) yields the desired result C∗1t >
C∗2t .
Proof of Lemma 2: Consider two identical, deadline-
ordered agents in the waiting state. The ordering of
threshold prices xˆ1t > xˆ
2
t follows from (6), provided that
C∗1t+1 > C
∗2
t+1. The latter condition is guaranteed by
Lemma 10 and induction using Lemma 11. Because this
holds for any two agents, it also holds for the entire col-
lection. The weakly ordered result follows by considering
agents with equal deadlines. Because such devices are
indistinguishable (other aspects were already identical),
symmetry requires that their threshold bids are identical.
Appendix B. Proof of Lemma 7
Proof. First, if no devices are available to start, then xt =
x∗t by virtue of P
∗
t being optimal, and 0 lies within the
bounds of (19) as required.
Next, we prove the lower bound for the clearing price.
The case xt < x
∗
t occurs when agents have (unrealistically)
low expectations for future costs and therefore submit low
bids. We consider the lowest possible bid placed by a
device that should start at t according to S. Theorem 3
guarantees that the lowest bid is placed by the device a
with the latest deadline da (among devices that should
start at t). The bid xˆ↓t of this device is bounded by the
lowest possible cost associated with waiting, according to
the inequality:
Cs,at (xˆ
↓
t ) ≥ min
t′∈{t+1,...,da−D}
∆t
D−1∑
i=0
Pi
[
mt′+i(P
∗
t′+i)− η
]
≥ min
t′∈{t+1,...,da−D}
Kat′ − η∆t
D−1∑
i=0
Pi, (B.1)
where the lower bounds of the price forecasts Xt′ and (10)
have been used. Cost-optimality of S and the fact that the
device should start at t implies Kt ≤ Kt′ (11), so that
Cs,at (xˆ
↓
t ) ≥ Kat − η∆t
D−1∑
i=0
Pi, (B.2)
≥ ∆t
D−1∑
i=0
Pi
[
mt+i(P
∗
t+i − Pi)− η
]
. (B.3)
Expanding Cs,at (xˆ
↓
t ) using (2) and making use of definition
(20) results in the inequality
P0
[
xˆ↓t − x∗t
]
≥ −
D−1∑
i=0
Pi [∆mt,i + η] (B.4)
If xt < x
∗
t , at least one fewer device has started than was
accounted for in the allocation S. Therefore, the bid xˆ↓t of
the marginal device must bound the clearing price xt from
below, and the lower bound of (19) follows.
The upper bound can be derived by considering devices
that should not start under S, but submit a high bid
because starting immediately appears to be cheaper than
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starting at their scheduled time ta > t. The magnitude of
such bids xˆat is bounded by
Cs,at (xˆ
a
t ) = C
∗a
t+1 (B.5)
≤ Cs,ata (xta) (B.6)
= ∆t
D−1∑
i=0
Pi
[
mta+i(P
∗
ta+i)
]
, (B.7)
where we have used (9) and the fact that the optimal ex-
pected cost C∗at+1 is always upper-bounded by the expected
cost for one specific feasible time t′ > t, including the
special case t′ = ta. Using the definition of Cs,at :
∆tP0 [xˆ
a
t − x∗t ] ≤ ∆t
D−1∑
i=0
Pi
[
mta+i(P
∗
ta+i)−mt+i(P ∗t+i)
]
≤ ∆t
D−1∑
i=0
Pi
[
mta+i(P
∗
ta+i)
]−Kat
≤ ∆t
D−1∑
i=0
Pi
[
mta+i(P
∗
ta+i)
]−Kata ,
≤ ∆t
D−1∑
i=0
Pi∆mta,i (B.8)
where we have used the fact that Kata ≤ Kat due to cost-
optimality of S. The bound for the highest bid xˆ↑t of a
device that should not run is therefore defined as
P0
[
xˆ↑t − x∗t
]
≤ max
a∈{a′∈A:ta>t}
D−1∑
i=0
Pi∆mta,i (B.9)
≤ max
t′∈{t,...,T}
D−1∑
i=0
Pi∆mt′,i (B.10)
If xt > x
∗
t , at least one more device started than in the
allocation S, so the clearing price xt must be at or below
xˆ↑t , and the upper bound of (19) follows.
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